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RECENT DECISIONS
heir at law in the estate of the decedent by virtue of the adoption. Held, A and
B are both heirs of the natural parent, adoption is not a bar to inheritance by B.
In re Estate of Martha Sauer (Wis., 1934) 257 N.W. 28.
Adoption, a practice unknown and unrecognized by the common law, has
existed among the nations of continental Europe from time immemorial. See,
Abney v. De Loach, 84 Ala. 393, 45 S.W. 750, 757, 759 (1888) ; Ross v. Ross, 129
Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321, 325 (1880). It was widely practiced, not only by
ancient peoples with high standards of civilization, but by the semi-barbaric
German tribes. See, Succession of Un forsake, 48 La. Ann. 546, 19 So. 602, 603
(1896). Under the Roman Law the adopted child was permitted to inherit from
his natural parents as well as from the parents by adoption. See, Sandar's "Insti-
tutes of Justinian," Lib. I, Tit. XII, XIII, pp. 113-120 (1st Am. Ed., 1876).
The adoption of children and strangers to the blood exists in this country
only by virtue of statute. See, Albing v. Ward, 137 Mich. 352, 100 N.W. 609, 610
(1904). In the absence of common law authority, the various states have in-
vaded the legal systems of continental Europe in search of nuclei about which
to build, their statutory scheme. See, Power v. Haley, 85 Ky. 671, 4 S.W. 683,
684 (1887). In most American jurisdictions the courts have recognized that these
statutory schemes permitting the adopted child to take by descent from the par-
ents by adoption have not affected his right to inherit from his natural parents.
Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N.E. 993 (1896); Wagner v. Varner, 50
Ia. 532 (1879); contra, Young v. Bridges, (N.H., 1933), 165 At. 272.
It was argued by the appellant in the principal case that the local legislature
had by its adoption statute indicated that the adopted child was not to take by
inheritance from its natural parents. Wis. Stats., (1933) § 322.07. The court
met this contention by pointing out that the legislature had deleted from the
original bill before it a specific provision purporting to deny the right of the
adopted child to take by inheritance from its natural parents. See, Asembly Bill
No. 237A, Session of 1929. The court said that this indicated that the legislature
did not mean that the adoption statute as eventually passed was to affect the
right of inheritance from the natural parents. Had the legislature literally pur-
ported to affect the right of inheritance from the natural parents there is reason
to believe that the Wisconsin court would have refused to uphold the statute.
The court has suggested several times that such statutes interfering with the
descent of property are subversive to the beneficent purposes of adoption, that
they are contrary to the natural and the common law, and are an unauthorized
invasion by the legislature of the rights of the individual. See, Nunnemacher v.
State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906) ; 'Estate of Bradley, 185 Wis. 393, 201
N.W. 973 (1925). It is submitted, too, that an attempted enforcement of such a
statute might raise a federal question under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625,
67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 96,
69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925).
RicHARD B. JoHNs.
TORTS-JOINT ENTERPRISE-IMPUTED NEGLGENE.-A husband and wife joint-
ly owned an automobile and both were the named assureds in the liability policy
issued thereon. In returning from a visit to their daughter's home and while
the husband was driving, they. collided with a freight car belonging to the de-
fendant railway company. In the plaintiff wife's action against the defendant
husband and the defendant railway company, the jury found the plaintiff free
from contributory negligence and that she had assumed no risk; it found both de-
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fendants negligent. From adverse judgments, both defendants appeal, Held,
judgment against the defendant husband affirmed; against the defendant rail-
way company reversed. The husband was driving not only in the exercise of his
right as joint owner, but on behalf of his wife, who was also an owner and
equally interested in the trip. Plaintiff and defendant were engaged in a joint
enterprise and his negligence is imputed to her. Archer v. Chicago, M., St. P. &
P. Ry. So. et al., (Wis., 1934) 255 N.W. 67.
Originally, the remedy of the passenger of a private vehicle against a negli-
gent third party was barred if the driver of the vehicle was negligent. Prideaux
v. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513, 28 Am. Rep. 558 (1878). With the develop-
ment of the host-guest doctrine the negligence of the driver was not imputed to
a passenger who (1) could exercise no control over the driver, (2) was not en-
gaged in a joint enterprise with him, (3) was guilty of no negligence himself, or,
(4) stood in no other relation to the driver requiring that his negligence be im-
puted to him. Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493, 181 N.W. 739, 18 A.L.R. 362 (1921).
The joint enterprise doctrine was borrowed from the principles of agency
as applied to associations contractual in nature and formed for mutual
financial benefit. For this reason it was held that joint enterprisers had the power
to control each other's movements. Mere marital relationship was not sufficient to
indicate joint enterprise where there was no joint financial understaking. Brit-
baker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N.W. 690, 18 A.L.R. 303 (1921) ; Kokesh
v. Price, 136 Minn. 304, 161 N.W. 715, 23 A.L.R. 643 (1917). Mutuality of inter-
est in a purely social adventure was not sufficient to take the case out of the
host-guest category. Kraus v. Hall, 195 Wis. 565, 217 N.W. 290 (1928) ; Soiner-
field v. Flury, 198 Wis 163, 223 N.W. 408 (1929) ; Denham v. Taylor, 15 La. App.
545, 131 So. 614 (1930). Where the defendant allowed a prospective purchaser
to drive his car and he testified that he sat alongside to give instructions in case
of emergency (although the car was similar to the one the prospective pur-
chaser had been driving for some time) the court disregarded the possibility of a
joint enterprise and held the defendant responsible as principal to an injured third
party. Lott v. Grant, Imp., 198 Wis. 291, 223 N.W. 846 (1929); Beaudoin v. W.
F. Mahaney, Inc., (Me., 1932) 159 At. 567. And where the husband, owner of
the car, asked his wife to drive, her negligence barred his recovery against a
negligent third party on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Wilcott v. Ley, 205
Wis. 155, 236 N.VAT. 593 (1931) ; Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553
(1931). But where the wife was injured while riding in a car driven by her
husband but registered in her name, the courts regard it as a bailment, and his
negligence does not bar her recovery against a negligent third party. Virginia R.
& Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 120 Va. 655, 91 S.E. 632 (1917); Rodgers v. Saxton,
305 Pa. 479, 158 At. 166, 80 A.L.R. 280 (1931).
In the instant case the court holds that there are two circumstances that
vitally affect the legal relations of the parties: first, join ownership of the car;
and, second, joint interest in the enterprise. In holding that the Brubaker case,
supra, is not in point here it is obvious that the court lays a great deal of stress
on the joint ownership of the car. This is in accord with the later cases. Seiden
v. Reimer, et al., 190 App. Div. 713, 180 N.Y.S. 345 (1920) affirmed in 232 N.Y.
593, 134 N.E. 535 (1922) ; Tannehill v. Kansas City C. & S. R. Co., 279 Mo. 158,
213 S.W. 818 (1919) (business partners on a business trip); Clark v. Town of
Hampton, (N.H. 1929) 145 Atl. 265; Lindquist v. Thiernran, et al., 216
Iowa 170, 248 N.W. 504 (1933) ; Restatement, Torts (Tent. Draft, 1933) § 30,
comment f.
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